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Abstract
Introduction: Deficits in decision making (DM) are commonly associated with prefrontal cortical damage, but may occur
with multiple sclerosis (MS). There are no data concerning the impact of MS on tasks evaluating DM under explicit risk,
where different emotional and cognitive components can be distinguished.
Methods: We assessed 72 relapsing-remitting MS (RRMS) patients with mild to moderate disease and 38 healthy controls in
two DM tasks involving risk with explicit rules: (1) The Wheel of Fortune (WOF), which probes the anticipated affects of
decisions outcomes on future choices; and (2) The Cambridge Gamble Task (CGT) which measures risk taking. Participants
also underwent a neuropsychological and emotional assessment, and skin conductance responses (SCRs) were recorded.
Results: In the WOF, RRMS patients showed deficits in integrating positive counterfactual information (p,0.005) and
greater risk aversion (p,0.001). They reported less negative affect than controls (disappointment: p = 0.007; regret: p = 0.01),
although their implicit emotional reactions as measured by post-choice SCRs did not differ. In the CGT, RRMS patients
differed from controls in quality of DM (p= 0.01) and deliberation time (p = 0.0002), the latter difference being correlated
with attention scores. Such changes did not result in overall decreases in performance (total gains).
Conclusions: The quality of DM under risk was modified by MS in both tasks. The reduction in the expression of
disappointment coexisted with an increased risk aversion in the WOF and alexithymia features. These concomitant
emotional alterations may have implications for better understanding the components of explicit DM and for the clinical
support of MS patients.
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Introduction
Multiple sclerosis (MS) is a widespread chronic inflammatory
disease of the central nervous system that affects primarily the
white matter but is also associated with early cortical demyelin-
ation and atrophy [1]. Functional alterations in cognitive and
affective functions are commonly observed and play an important
role in the everyday disabilities of MS patients. Several studies
have demonstrated deficits in frontal lobe functions, including
impaired working memory [2], diminished verbal fluency [3],
increased sensitivity to interference [3] and impaired conceptual
reasoning [4]. Other behavioral studies reported associations
between the occurrence of depression and damage in frontal and
temporal cortices [5], as well as a lack of functional connectivity
linking prefrontal areas to the amygdala during emotional
processing [6].
Decision making (DM) is another important function known to
implicate prefrontal areas, but is often neglected in clinical
neuropsychological assessment and rarely studied in MS patients.
A certain number of studies of MS patients ([7], see also below)
have focused on DM under ambiguous conditions (i.e., where the
risk associated with a choice is not explicitly given) by using the
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) [8]. This test allows a sensitive
detection of DM impairments in several neurological conditions
and informs on the ability of a subject or a patient to modify its
quality of DM, or on its eventual insensibility to monetary losses.
To solve the task successfully, subjects have to decipher the
relevant but implicit rules based on the feedback received
following each choice, as well as to deal with long-term strategies
to maximize gains, which can be accomplished by following their
subjective affective feelings and hunches as proposed by the
Somatic Marker hypothesis [9]. IGT performances and strategies
are influenced by both executive [10] and emotional processes [8].
Recent studies using the IGT have shown that DM processes
are defective in all MS subtypes, i.e., relapsing-remitting (RR) [11–
13], as well as primary progressive and secondary progressive MS
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[14], which is consistent with the impact of white-matter loss on
both executive and emotional functions. While DM can be
preserved in very early RRMS patients [15], we found by means
of a two-year follow-up study that such abilities rapidly declined
over time, independently of other disease-evolution markers [7].
All these results underscore the fact that MS patients may fail in
choosing advantageously when confronted with ambiguous
situations.
The exact mechanisms underlying ambiguous DM deficits in
MS are complex, but seem to rely at least partly on affective
modifications associated with the disease. MS patients do indeed
have difficulties in expressing or describing emotions [16,17]. We
previously found an association of performance in the IGT with
lower anxiety scores and decreased emotional experience as
measured by skin conductance responses [11], but not with
classical executive tests, suggesting specifically impaired affective
processes in DM under ambiguity. In fact, affective modifications
induced by MS include alexithymia and some difficulties in
recognition of facial emotions, and impaired emotional reactivity
to negative stimuli is emerging as a consistent feature of patients
with MS [18,19]. By using alternative versions of the IGT, Nagy
et al. [13] also showed that DM deficits in MS seemed to mimic
those of patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC)
damage, and appeared to be driven by recent outcomes
independently from gains or losses, rather than by an overall
increased sensitivity to reward and risk taking behavior. Such
behavior, driven by short-term benefits, has sometimes been called
‘myopia for the future’ [20].
In daily life, a certain number of situations in which decisions
have to be made offer explicit information about the potential
consequences of the choice, thus requiring the subjects to decide
between alternatives that are defined in terms of probabilities and
associated with known rewards and punishments. These kinds of
explicit decisions, called ‘‘decisions under risk’’ [21], also seem to
implicate cognitive (probabilistic) and emotional processes [22].
Among the various tasks developed to test DM under risk, the
Wheels of Fortune task (WOF) is an explicit task in which the
subjects see online what they could have won or lost if they had
chosen differently. This task has been used to show that DM
strategies can be influenced by anticipation of regret [23]. The
WOF was developed on the basis of the Decision Affect Theory
[24] which emphasizes the role of anticipated affective impacts of
decisions on future choices. By confronting the participant with
the comparison of ‘‘what is’’ with ‘‘what might have been’’
(counterfactual thinking), this task allows cognitively-generated
emotions such as disappointment and regret to be measured
[23,25,26]. The WOF provides a measure of how decisions and
risk taking are modified under the pressure of such emotions.
Another explicit DM task is the Cambridge Gamble Task
(CGT), a well known paradigm in which the subject can visualize
options while deciding the exact chance of winning or losing his
bet, which allows a differentiated assessment of impulsive response
tendencies and real risk taking. Moreover, classical executive
processes such as working memory are minimized in the CGT,
since the information required to make the decision is presented
explicitly on each trial. The CGT was developed to assess DM and
risk taking [21] in patients with damage to the VMPFC
[10,27,28]. This task has revealed increased risk preference in
these patients, whereas their probabilistic judgment (i.e., quality of
DM) was similar to that of the controls. Performance of focal
brain-damaged patients on this task suggest that VMPFC lesions
lead to selective increases in risk-taking behaviors, while lesions in
the insular cortex (IC) lead to difficulties in betting calculations
[29,30].
Given the previous evidence for a modification of both
emotional experiences [11] and cognitive competencies [3] related
to MS, as well as the potential impact of MS lesion on the
integration of these two types of information necessary for optimal
DM, it is likely that explicit DM might also be impaired or
modified in these patients. However, the absence of lesions limited
to the VMPFC, and the frequent occurrence of anxiety disorders
in MS patients [31], might predict that the pathological
modification in DM might not necessarily involve an increase in
explicit risk taking [32], but could instead reduce risk taking
strategies. To our knowledge, there are no data concerning the
effect of MS on DM competence under risk, and no correlations
between explicit DM performance and specific performances of
cognitive or affective functioning in such patients. Therefore, we
examined here the performances of MS patients in two explicit
decision situations. We asked whether MS patients would behave
differently from healthy controls, particularly in situations where
decisions are based on emotional signals. For this purpose, we used
the two classic explicit gambling tasks, the WOF and CGT
mentioned above, all given to the same patients.
We predicted that MS patients would show changes in explicit
DM for both the WOF and CGT, and this should be associated
with modifications in emotional domains in these patients. Our
main hypotheses were the following:
1) MS patients will present a different choice behavior of DM
under risk than controls; this might be the case in both the WOF
and CGT; 2) Such modifications will not necessarily reflect
increased risk taking -unlike in patients with restricted lesions to
VMPFC- but MS patients might even rather present risk aversion,
at least in situations where the anticipated affective impact of
decisions can influence future choices (such as the WOF); 3) Such
DM modifications in MS patients might be associated with specific
emotional changes, as previously observed for implicit DM [11],
but not necessarily associated with cognitive changes. Therefore,
all patients were carefully examined with a systematic cognitive
evaluation and measures –during the WOF- of both explicit and
implicit emotional reactions.
Materials and Methods
Study Subjects
RRMS patients conforming to the McDonald diagnostic criteria
[33,34] were contacted for the study. Inclusion criteria were: (1)
mild to moderate neurological disability, but with unimpaired
ambulation (Expanded Disability Status Scale [EDSS] ranging
from 1.5 to 3.5) [35]; (2) no clinical relapse and no corticosteroid
therapy for at least six weeks before inclusion in the study; (3) no
diagnosis of major depression, alcohol or drug abuse or other
psychiatric disorders according to the DSM-IV criteria. Seventy-
two patients, aged between 18 and 48 years old, were analyzed.
Thirty-nine patients were treated with disease-modifying therapies
(interferon b-1a or 1b in most cases) for a mean period of 3.3 years
(ranging from two months to nine years), ten were taking
antidepressants for minor mood symptoms which were not severe
enough to fulfill the diagnostic criteria for depression as assessed in
a psychiatric interview, and five had had symptomatic treatment
for fatigue (amantadine or modafinil). The control group consisted
of 38 healthy volunteers matched for age, gender and education,
with no history of alcohol or drug abuse, major psychiatric
disorders (major depression, psychosis, untreated bipolar disor-
ders), head trauma, other neurological disorders, or systemic
illness.
Decision Making under Explicit Risk in MS
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Standard Protocol Approvals, Registrations and Patient
Consents
The study was approved by the local university’s Ethics
Committee, and all subjects gave written informed consent for
their participation in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
The Name of the Ethic Committee is the following: ‘‘Commission
d’Ethique de la recherche clinique, Faculte´ de me´decine et de
biologie, Universite´ de Lausanne, Switzerland’’. The name of the
accepted project (2007) was: ‘‘Dissecting the decisional process in
patients with Multiple Sclerosis’’. In order to maintain motivation,
participants were informed that they would receive money as
a function of their final gains in the DM tasks. For ethical reasons,
in actual fact they all received 20 Swiss Francs at the end of the
study.
Neuropsychological Examination
All participants underwent a neuropsychological examination,
to test whether DM deficits were associated with specific pattern of
cognitive deficits. The Brief Repeatable Battery of Neuropsycho-
logical Tests (BRB-N) [36,37] was used to assess verbal memory
(Selective Reminding Test [SRT]), spatial memory (10/36 Spatial
Recall Test), sustained attention/information processing speed (3-
second version of the Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test
[PASAT], Symbol Digit Modalities Test [SDMT]), and verbal
fluency in semantic cues (Word List Generation [WLG]). In
addition to the BRB-N, we administered a task which assessed
more complex executive skills (Stockings of Cambridge [SOC]
from the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery
[CANTAB]) [38].
Emotional and Behavioral Examination
At the end of the second testing session, subjects filled out
questionnaires assessing mood (Hospital Anxiety and Depression
scale, HAD) [39] and behavioral changes (Dysexecutive Ques-
tionnaire, DEX) [40]. The DEX was used for quantifying
behavioral disturbances commonly associated with executive
impairment and has already been used in MS studies [41]. This
last questionnaire was aimed at investigating whether specific
behavioural changes/symptoms in MS are associated with
eventual DM changes. The 20 items of the DEX encompass
broad areas of likely changes (impulsivity, apathy, desinhibition,
intentionality, etc.). Each item is scored on a 5-point scale ranging
from ‘‘never’’ to ‘‘very often’’ (0 to 4).
Wheels of Fortune
The Wheels of Fortune (WOF) task [23] was used to measure
the emotional strategies associated with DM under risk. This task
had previously shown that advantageous decisions in healthy
controls could be induced through prior experiencing disappoint-
ment and regret (Fig. 1A) [23].
Two wheels were presented on a computer screen (Gamble 1
and Gamble 2). Each wheel was divided into two sectors (black
and light blue) associated with different amounts of money. The
size of each sector represented the probability of obtaining the
proposed outcome. The possible outcomes for each individual
gamble were visible on the screen and were formed by any pair of
the following values: 250, +50, 2200, +200 (units corresponding
to cents in Swiss francs), and associated with different outcome
probabilities (0.8, 0.2, and 0.5). The subject was asked to choose
one of the two wheels by pressing a left or a right button (choice
period). A spinning arrow then appeared at the center of the
wheel, turned for a variable duration (wait period), and stopped in
one of the two sectors, revealing the outcome which resulted in
a financial gain or loss (feedback period). At the end of each trial,
subjects had to indicate their affective state using a rating scale
ranging from 250 (extremely sad) to +50 (extremely happy).
The task included two conditions given in separate blocks. In
the ‘‘partial feedback’’ condition (PF; 30 trials), the spinning arrow
and the related outcome were apparent for the selected wheel
only. In this condition, the unfavorable comparison of the
obtained outcome with a more favorable counterfactual (i.e.,
unobtained) outcome may have induced disappointment related to
the financial consequence of a decision [23]. By contrast, in the
‘‘complete feedback’’ condition (CF; 30 trials), spinning arrows
appeared, rotated and stopped in both the selected and the non-
selected wheels, revealing both outcomes to the participants. CF
trials induced not only disappointment but also regret, by showing
the outcome that would have been obtained if participants had
selected the other gamble (counterfactual outcome).
Skin Conductance Response Recording
Skin conductance responses (SCRs) were recorded during the
WOF task using the PowerLab/GSR amplifier system (AD
Instruments GmbH, Spechbach, Germany). This was done in
order to obtain the physiological correlate of regret, which
consisted of an increase of SCRs in the CF condition due to
counterfactual processing, as compared to the PF condition of the
WOF. The SCRs represent an indicator of sympathetic nervous
system activation, which is believed to contribute to the process of
making advantageous choices for the organism.
SCR data were acquired continuously using flat-surface
electrodes placed on the non-dominant hand and stored for off-
line analysis using a second computer running Chart v4.2
software. The SCRs of interest were those generated during the
five-second interval following the viewing of the obtained outcome
(feedback period, post-choice SCRs). Sixty five-second time points
were recorded for each subject. Artefactual signals (e.g., the
subject’s movements) were cleared manually. Mean amplitudes
(microSiemens, mS) recorded during each five-second time window
were analyzed (i.e., the mean of the data points obtained in the
five-second selection). Baseline SCR activity was assessed using
three measurements per subject recorded: (1) at rest; (2) in
response to a loud noise; and (3) after a deep breath. This method
had been applied in a previous study [11] and had been shown to
be reliable.
Cambridge Gamble Task
The Cambridge Gamble Task (CGT) [21] was used to measure
DM (Fig. 1B). Participants sat in front of a computer touch screen.
Trials were run in blocks (two sets of four blocks per subject), each
containing nine trials. A block could finish prematurely if it ended
in bankruptcy. At the beginning of each block, they were given
100 points. A row of ten boxes (red or blue, with a ratio varying
across the trials) was presented at the top of the screen and
participants were told that a yellow token was hidden in one of the
boxes. They then had to guess whether it was in a red or blue box
and to decide how many of their points they wanted to gamble on
their choice (5%, 25%, 50%, 75% or 95%, given in a progressively
ascending or descending order depending on the blocks). A
winning choice was rewarded by the total of points gambled,
whereas a losing choice was punished by subtracting that number
of points. The probability of each choice being correct was
indicated to the subjects by the ratio between red and blue boxes.
This produced a variety of situations, ranging from those in which
one outcome was the most likely (e.g., nine red boxes to one blue
box) to those in which both outcomes were almost equally likely
(six to four). We used the standard version provided by CANTAB
Decision Making under Explicit Risk in MS
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 December 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 12 | e50718
Decision Making under Explicit Risk in MS
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 December 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 12 | e50718
(http://www.cantab.com/cantab-tests-cambridge-gambling-task.
asp) with a 5:5 ratio of red-blue boxes also included in the design
to ensure that participants perceived the task as a random trial
sequence. Therefore, it was hypothesized that the CGT allowed
participants to apply cognitive strategies, such as probabilistic
judgment, in order to decide advantageously. The ascending and
descending sequence in which potential wins were proposed
enabled us to differentiate patients with impulsive response
tendencies from patients with real risk preference (i.e., risk-
preferent patients had to wait if they wanted to place high bets in
the ascending conditions). Measures of behavior choices were
quality of DM (the proportion of trials where participants chose
the more likely outcome) and deliberation time.
Statistical Analyses
Statistical analyses were conducted using a STATA software
package (Version 10.0). Non-parametric tests were applied to all
the demographic and behavioral data because (1) the CGT and
WOF data could not be transformed successfully to reach
normality, and (2) the distribution of the WOF emotional ratings
is by definition non-normal as the scale is restricted (values
available from 250 to +50) and thus cannot be considered as
a continuous variable. Differences were examined using Chi2 tests
for the comparison of categorical variables and Wilcoxon signed
rank tests for the comparison of continuous variables. To measure
the possible influences of executive, attentional and emotional
variables on decisional performances, we then computed single
Spearman correlation analyses with certain outcome measures in
the following executive tasks: SOC, SDMT, and PASAT.
For the WOF task, we first analyzed the emotional evaluations
of decisional outcomes and then tested two models of choice
computed by regression analyses, using a panel logit procedure
with an individual random effect. The panel data analysis took
each subject as the unit and the trial as the time. The random
effects model was used as the default model, and the parameters
were estimated by maximum likelihood. This statistical procedure
is extensively described elsewhere [23,26]. The first model
integrated the effects of anticipating disappointment (d, negative
emotion expressed in the PF condition when facing a negative
outcome) and regret (r, negative emotion induced by the
counterfactual comparison of a negative obtained outcome with
a more advantageous outcome for the rejected alternative) in
addition to the maximization of expected values (EV, choices of
the most favorable odds, reflecting quality of DM and risk taking).
In fact, as we have already mentioned, a subject obtaining an
outcome lower than expected might experience disappointment or
regret. The greater the difference between the expected and the
obtained outcome, the more intense this negative feeling will be.
Thus, to avoid future disappointment or regret, the subject might
progressively adapt his or her choice behavior by selecting
a gamble that minimizes the difference between the lowest and
highest outcomes, weighted by the probability of the worst possible
outcome. This is what we call anticipation of disappointment and
regret.
In the second model [42], we used the logit regression to
estimate the probability of the participant choosing the first
gamble, as a function of the difference in EV (dEV) and standard
deviation (a measure of risk) between the first and second lottery:
Pr (c~1Dc)~
exp (azb(dEV )zc(risk)
1z exp (azb(dEV )zc(risk)
The variables dEV and risk are defined as follows:
dEV~EV1{EV2~ px1z(1{p)y1½ { qdx2z(1{q)y2½ 
risk~risk1{risk2
~
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
p(x1{EV1)
2z(1{p)(y1{EV1)
2
q
{
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
q(x2{EV2)
2z(1{q)(y2{EV2)
2
q
where x1, y1 and x2, y2 are the two possible outcomes of the first
and the second lotteries respectively, with x1.y1, and x2.y2. The
probability of x1 is p and the probability of y1 is (1–p). The
probability of x2 is q and the probability of y2 is (1–q). Thus
a positive (negative) and significant dEV or risk coefficient
indicates that subjects consistently choose the lottery with the
highest (lowest) expected value or level of risk respectively.
For the CGT, choice behavior and betting behavior were
analyzed separately [30] on the basis of the scores calculated
through the CGT program. It should be noted that trials with a 5:5
ratio of red-blue boxes, included in the design to mimic a random
trial sequence, were excluded from the statistical analyses. The
analysis of the participant’s betting behavior was also limited to the
trials in which the subjects chose the most likely color, in order to
maintain independence from choice behavior. The patients’ and
controls’ scores were directly compared using Mann-Whitney non
parametric tests.
Results
Demographic, Clinical and Neuropsychological Data
The demographic, clinical and neuropsychological character-
istics of all the participants are reported in Table 1. RRMS
patients and controls did not differ in terms of age, years of
education or gender.
After correction for multiple comparisons, the RRMS patients
scored lower than the controls in measures of attention/processing
speed (SDMT: z=22.97, p = 0.003), and executive functioning
(SOC-subsequent thinking time: z =22.81, p = 0.005). Concern-
Figure 1. Description of the two gambling tasks. A) Wheel of Fortune (WOF): the subject (with SCR recorded) has to choose between two
possible lotteries with different risk and earning possibilities. The subject was asked to choose one of the two wheels by pressing a left or a right
button (choice period). A spinning arrow then appeared at the center of the wheel, spins for a variable duration (wait period), and stopped revealing
the outcome(s) (feedback period). In the partial feedback condition (30 trials) the subject does not know the outcome of the other lottery; in the
complete feedback condition (30 trials) both outcomes are presented. At the end of each trial, subjects had to indicate their affective state using
a rating scale. B) Cambridge gambling task (CGT): the subject has to bet points on a choice associated with a given level of risk. Trials are run in blocks
(two sets of four blocks), each containing nine trials. A row of ten boxes (red or blue, with a ratio varying across trials) is presented at the top of the
screen. Participants are told that a yellow token was hidden in one of the boxes. They then have to guess whether it is in a red or blue box (color).
Then they decide how many of their points they wanted to gamble on their choice (point choice) by pressing when they choose: available bets (5, 25,
75, 95 and total) are presented on the right of the screen in a ascending or descending sequence. Then feedback is given about gain or loss and total
ongoing fortune (left).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050718.g001
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ing emotional scores, the RRMS patients reported higher anxiety
(z =22.51, p= 0.012) scores in the HAD.
Emotional Decision Making: The Wheels of Fortune Task
Choice behavior. Results based on regression analyses
(Table 2A, Fig. 2) showed that the controls, but not MS patients,
chose by anticipating disappointment (b=20.0036, p,0.001).
The second regression analysis (Table 2B, Fig. 2) revealed that the
RRMS patients were more risk averse (b=20.0029, p,0.001)
relative to the healthy controls, who were risk neutral (b=0.0013,
p = 0.1).
Emotional evaluation. Results from the emotional ratings in
the WOF showed that the RRMS patients reported less negative
affective reactions, as compared with the controls, for both
disappointment (z =22.45, p= 0.01) and regret (z =22.38,
p = 0.02). In contrast, their explicit expression of positive emotion
was comparable (Figure 3A). To test the hypothesis of a general
deficit in evaluating negative feedbacks, a linear regression was run
separately for positive and negative outcomes testing the influence
of obtained outcome, counterfactual outcome (i.e., unobtained by
a chosen gamble during the PF and obtained by an unchosen
gamble during the CF), and group on the affective ratings. We
found no effect of the [obtained outcome x group] interaction for
positive outcomes (b=0.01, p = 0.2), meaning that both groups
rated positive outcomes in the same way. By contrast, the effect of
the [obtained outcome x group] interaction showed a strong trend
after Bonferroni correction towards negative outcomes (b=0.04,
p,0.005), confirming that RRMS patients rated negative out-
comes less negatively than the controls. Finally, concerning
counterfactual outcomes, there was an effect of counterfactual
outcome x group for both the positive (b=0.01, p,0.005) and
negative (b=0.01, p,0.05) conditions, indicating a general deficit
in the integration of counterfactual information in the explicit
evaluation process for the RRMS patients. There were no
significant correlation between measure of regret and cognitive
scores.
Skin conductance response recording. SCR baseline re-
activity was comparable in RRMS patients and controls at rest
(z =21.46, p = 0.1), in response to loud noise (z =21.43, p= 0.1)
and after deep breaths (z =21.18, p = 0.2). These baseline effects
rule out any global dysfunction of the autonomic nervous system in
Table 1. Demographics, clinical neuropsychological characteristics of MS patients and controls.
Controls (n =38) MS patients (n =72) p-values
Gender1, women 24 (63%) 46 (63%) 0.85
Age, y 32.467.6 34.666.3 0.11
Education, y 15.462.5 14.662.8 0.09
Disease duration, y – 5.0663.3 –
EDSS score – 1.960.5 –
Immunomodifying therapy1 – 39 pt –
SRT-Long-term retrieval2 58.3612.4 53.3612.2 0.03
SRT-Delayed recall2 11.261.6 10.961.7 0.38
10/36-Total learning score2 23.365.1 21.965.1 0.27
10/36-Delayed recall2 8.661.9 8.162.1 0.25
SDMT2 61.669.6 55.0611.1 0.003
PASAT2 32.8966.8 50.769.5 0.055
WLG2 30.566.2 27.76578 0.009
SOC-Initial time thinking 0.4860.6 0.4161.1 0.47
SOC-Subsequent time thinking 0.361.0 20.762.0 0.005
SOC-Problems solved 0.160.9 20.361.0 0.5
HAD-A 6.563.1 8.563.1 0.012
HAD-D 2.3263.1 3.8362 0.017
DEX 22.768.4 26.269.6 0.05
Values are mean 6 standard deviation (SD), excepted for 1where values are n. 2Brief Repeatable Battery of Neuropsychological tests (BRB-N): Selective Reminding Test
(SRT), 10/36 Spatial Recall Test (10/36), Symbol Digit Modalities Test (SDMT), Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test (PASAT), Word List Generation (WLG). SOC: Stockings of
Cambridge; HAD: Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050718.t001
Figure 2. Model of choice integrating the effects of disap-
pointment and risk in addition to the maximization of
expected values. Negative coefficients reflect minimization of
disappointment or risk. Model A integrates the effects of anticipating
disappointment (d) in addition to the maximization of expected values
(EV). MS patients did not minimize d. Model B integrates the effects of
risk in addition to the maximization of expected values (e). Healthy
controls were risk neutral while MS patients were risk averse.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050718.g002
Decision Making under Explicit Risk in MS
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 December 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 12 | e50718
the patients. During the WOF task, SCRs were significantly
increased in both the RRMS patients and controls in response to
the presentation of the outcome of the rejected alternative,
reflecting the emotional nature of this information (RRMS
patients: z = 2.90, p= 0.004; controls: z = 2.09, p= 0.04). This
preserved effect in RRMS also reveals an implicit integration of
counterfactual information that differed from the lack of explicit
use in their affective ratings. In contrast with emotional ratings
reported by participants after each trial, SCRs reactivity did not
differ between the RRMS patients and controls, neither for
positive (z =20.63, p= 0.50) nor for negative outcomes
(z =20.71, p= 0.50) (Figure 3B).
Cognitive Decision Making: the Cambridge Gamble Task
Choice behavior. The RRMS patients differed from the
controls (Table 3, Fig. 4) for both measures of choice behavior:
they selected the most favorable odds less often (95% 60.5 of trials
vs. 98% 60.8 for controls; z = 2.44, p = 0.01) and exhibited longer
deliberation times before choosing (24136905 ms vs.
19346541 ms for controls; z =23.38, p,0.001). However, when
computing the total number of blocks ending up in bankruptcy
(i.e. blocks interrupted when the total score reached #1 point), no
difference between groups was observed (z =21.32, p= 0.2).
In the MS group, several correlation analyses were computed
between the quality of DM and relevant executive performance
(three outcome measures of the SOC and performances in the
WLG task), attention scores (SDMT, PASAT), affective state
(values of the HAD), and behavioral changes (DEX questionnaire).
Following Type 1 error correction, Spearman correlation test
showed that, in RRMS patients, the quality of DM showed no
direct relations with measures of executive functioning. By
contrast, deliberation times correlated negatively with attention/
processing speed measures (PASAT: r =20.364, p= 0.002).
Discussion
The present study is, to our knowledge, the first to assess DM in
RRMS patients using two explicit tasks with known outcome
probabilities, and a differential recruitment of cognitive and
emotional components. Our main hypothesis was that RRMS
patients would show modified strategies in explicit DM. Moreover,
we looked for decreased risk taking, and modifications in
emotional experience. Our results support these hypotheses: (1)
RRMS patients showed, in comparison to controls, a poorer
quality of DM, as indicated by the fact that they did not maximize
the expected values in the WOF task, and that they selected less
often the most likely odds in the CGT; (2) RRMS showed greater
risk aversion; (3) RRMS patients were less sensitive to counter-
factual information in the WOF task and exhibited a decreased
sensitivity to explicit negative emotional experience (measured by
questionnaire), but not in covert emotional reactions (measured by
SCR). On the contrary, a significant association with cognitive
functions (but not emotional indices) was found for the CGT task,
with a selective correlation between initial decision time and
performance in an attentional task (PASAT), suggesting that
overall cognitive changes had little impact on choice behavior.
These modifications in MS patients are significant although of
smaller magnitude in comparison with those reported after
orbitofrontal [23] and insular lesions [30], or in comparison with
changes detected in DM under ambiguity [11]. In addition, they
did not cause increased bankruptcy in DM or overall gain
decrease. This suggests that MS modifies, rather than totally
disrupts, explicit DM abilities, at least in the mild to moderate
phase of the disease.
These behavioral results converge nevertheless with those
obtained in studies dealing with DM under ambiguity in similar
patients. The latter studies used the IGT and reported a consistent
failure of the decisional process within a learning context of simple
feedback contingencies [7,11,13]. Moreover, the finding of Nagy
Table 2. Choice behavior in the Wheels of Fortune task for MS patients and healthy controls (regression analyses, panel logit with
individual random effect).
Healthy controls (n=38) MS patients (n =72)
A
choice Coeff Std Err z p Coeff Std Err z p
EV 0.0338 0.0018 18.49 ,0.001 0.0271 0.0012 22.26 ,0.001
d 20.0036 0.0008 24.32 ,0.001 0.0004 0.0006 0.67 .502
r 0.0035 0.0006 5.96 ,0.001 0.0054 0.0004 12.19 ,0.001
cst 0.3300 0.0763 4.32 ,0.001 0.1954 0.0520 3.75 ,0.001
Log likelihood =2673.57; Wald chi2(2) = 552.77; prob.chi2 = 0.0000 Log likelihood =21298.23; Wald chi2(2) = 1100.22; prob.chi2 = 0.0000
B
choice Coeff Std Err z p Coeff Std Err z p
EV 0.0297 0.0013 23.39 ,0.001 0.0284 0.0009 32.33 ,0.001
risk 0.0013 0.0008 1.57 0.116 20.0029 0.0006 24.58 ,0.001
cst 0.1876 0.0678 2.77 0.006 0.0391 0.0480 0.81 0.415
Log likelihood =2729.01; Wald chi2(2) = 555.41; prob.chi2 = 0.0000 Log likelihood =21397.32; Wald chi2(2) = 1109.13; prob.chi2 = 0.0000
A. Model of choice integrating the effects of anticipating disappointment (d) and regret (r) in addition to the maximization of expected values (EV). Both MS patients
and controls chose anticipating r and maximizing EV. MS patients did not choose anticipating d.
B. Model of choice integrating the effects of risk in addition to the maximization of expected values (e). Healthy controls were risk neutral while MS patients were risk
averse.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050718.t002
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et al. [13], i.e., that DM impairment in MS is not necessarily
associated with increased sensitivity to reward and increased risk
taking, nicely dovetail with our data, which suggest greater risk
aversion. The role of a decreased emotional reactivity related to
changes in DM was hypothesized based on reduced SCRs [11]. In
the current study, we now show that RRMS patients may modify
their strategies in DM under explicit risk conditions.
Associated Mechanisms
The correlation of DM mechanisms with overall cognitive and
behavioral (DEX) functioning was weak. The only significant
association with cognitive performances was found between the
CGT deliberation time task and a measure of attentional/working
memory performance (PASAT). This correlation may reflect the
known slower processing speed in the MS group, and explains also
why deliberation time at the CGT is prolonged in MS patients.
Concerning emotional processing, we found a significant re-
lation between counterfactual outcome and group in the WOF,
suggesting that a global deficit by MS patients in integrating
counterfactual information in the evaluation process may play
a direct role in the modification of DM. Different studies have
provided behavioral evidence for a role of counterfactual
anticipation of regret and relief in DM, but also in probabilistic
learning [43]. This raises the question of whether probabilistic
learning might be more globally decreased in MS patients and
thus might account for this difficulty. To our knowledge, this
question, i.e., how patients learn the contingencies between
environmental stimuli and their consequences, has been addressed
only infrequently in neurological diseases [44]. On the other hand,
the deficits in the WOF task in our patients were associated with
a failure to rate and use emotional experiences adequately in order
to maximize expected values. These results suggest that, like in the
IGT [11], modifications in emotional experience may be
associated with changes in DM under explicit risk. Moreover,
they point to the role of an overt emotional evaluation rather than
a somatic implicit marker.
Neuroanatomical Hypotheses
The correlation between lesion load and cognitive functions was
overall weak in MS and we did not perform a systematic
quantitative lesion analysis in our study [45,46]. However, our
RRMS patients showed a decrease in betting behavior but with an
increase in risk aversion during both DM tasks, suggesting that
changes in betting was not due to high risk biases like in VMPFC
patients. This result adds further weight to the finding of Nagy
et al. [13] that DM impairment in MS patients is not related to an
increased sensitivity to reward. In addition, this pattern suggests
dissociation between the mechanisms promoting risky choices and
risk aversion, which may be differentially affected by focal damage
to the VMPFC and by more diffuse white-matter lesions,
respectively.
Risk Aversion and Emotional Reactivity
An important result which was found in both gambling tasks
concerned risk aversion, particularly present in the WOF task. It
has been proposed that, in cases of impaired DM or probabilistic
judgment, the reduction of risk might reflect a compensatory
mechanism designed to maintain the final performance [47]. This
could potentially provide an explanation for our observations.
RRMS patients might behave in a more conservative manner
because of a loss of confidence in their choices. A further possible
explanation for risk aversion might stem from our findings in the
WOF task, where the RRMS patients demonstrated a distinctive
alteration of emotional processing. When confronted with negative
outcomes during the task, the patients expressed significantly less
disappointment and less regret than the controls, whereas the
rating of positive emotions was comparable in both groups. This
behavior echoes other similar findings in emotional tasks in MS
patients [19], and cannot be due to a general disinterest in the task,
since this would rather lead to an overall reduction of magnitude
of emotional rating. The amplification effect (i.e., the difference in
negative ratings obtained in PF vs. CF conditions) which is an
indication of regret was also non-significant in these patients,
indicating decreased counterfactual processing and deficient
anticipation of the negative emotions of losses. In more general
terms, these data suggest a deficit in incorporating counterfactual
information into the explicit emotional evaluation process. This
could reflect a deficit in consciously integrating different sources of
information during DM, perhaps due to disconnection lesions in
MS patients, and demonstrates that a lack of explicit counterfac-
tual regret may arise without damage to the orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC) itself (see [23]).
Strikingly, although RRMS patients reported disappointment
and regret to a significantly lesser extent as compared to healthy
participants, we could not demonstrate any differences in SCRs
between the RRMS patients and healthy controls. Although SCR
signals are much more variable than self-report scales, and may
therefore be too noisy to demonstrate reliable differences between
these groups, our finding contrasts with previous results that
suggested that a decreased emotional reactivity may underlie
impaired DM in ambiguous situations [11]. Although the role for
differences between the tasks used across studies cannot be
Figure 3. Emotional processing in the WOF task. A. Diminished negative emotional ratings in RRMS patients. Mean emotional ratings were
plotted for disappointment (comparison of an obtained outcome with a more favorable unobtained outcome in partial feedback condition), regret
(comparison of an obtained outcome with a more favorable unobtained outcome in complete feedback condition), rejoy (comparison of an obtained
outcome with a less favorable unobtained outcome in partial feedback condition) and relief (comparison of an obtained outcome with a less
favorable unobtained outcome in complete feedback condition). Wilcoxon signed rank tests between groups for disappointment and regret:
disappointment (z =22.45, p = 0.01) and regret (z =22.38, p = 0.02). B. Comparable emotional arousal in SCRs for RRMS patients and controls. Mean
SCRs during feedback plotted for disappointment, regret, rejoy and relief. No statistical differences between groups.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050718.g003
Figure 4. Quality of DM in the Cambridge Gambling Task.
Comparisons in terms of choice behavior between MS patients and
controls in the CGT (% of best choices).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050718.g004
Decision Making under Explicit Risk in MS
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 December 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 12 | e50718
excluded, one explanation for this difference in SCRs values might
be found in the population that was investigated in the current
study. Indeed, in this present case, we enrolled only RRMS
patients with low neurological disability. By contrast, Kleeberg
et al. [11] studied both RRMS and secondary progressive MS
patients who had more severe neurological disability (EDSS
between 1.5 and 6.5) and longer disease duration (mean 103
months). It might thus be hypothesized that emotional reactivity
declines over time as a result of disease progression but is still
preserved in early RRMS.
In our view, the lack of self-reported disappointment and regret
could reflect a deficit akin to alexithymia. The term alexithymia
was first defined by Sifneos [48] to describe an inability to find
appropriate words to identify, express or describe emotions, and
a difficulty in differentiating feelings from bodily sensations. It has
been reported in a variety of neurological diseases [49–51]. In MS,
alexithymia has also been reported in a large proportion of
patients, ranging from 13% to 43% according to various studies
[16,17]. Our work reinforces these clinical observations by
providing more experimental perspective on this phenomenon,
and by showing for the first time that reduced use of emotional
signals or ‘‘alexithymia-like’’ mechanisms might underlie impair-
ments in DM behavior. Furthermore, it has been shown that
explicit emotional evaluation (i.e., emotional ‘‘appraisal’’) may also
contribute to effective DM and that emotion regulation strategies
(in particular cognitive reappraisal) may have beneficial effects on
DM both under risk and under uncertainty [52]. Thus, it is
plausible that some form or components of alexithymia might be
directly related to increased risk aversion and decreased DM, as
observed in our MS patients.
Finally, by showing that alexithymic losses may arise concom-
itantly to impaired DM performance in RRMS patients, our
results highlight that affective processes might contribute to
normal DM and its impairment in MS. From a neurobiological
point of view, recent neuroimaging studies have emphasized the
implication of specific brain areas in alexithymia phenomena,
including the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the premotor cortex
and the amygdala [53,54]. Therefore, we speculate that the white-
matter prefrontal lesion load caused by MS [55] might lead to
a decreased structural and functional connectivity within a wide
brain network, composed of the OFC, DLPFC, and limbic areas,
which might in turn contribute to the impaired integration of
cognitive and affective signals, and thus deficient decisional
processes in MS. To support this hypothesis at least in part, a lack
of functional connectivity between prefrontal areas and the
amygdala during emotional processing has been recently reported
in patients with early MS in a functional magnetic resonance
imaging study [6].
In conclusion, DM under risk was found to be modified in MS
patients. However, unlike frontal patients, RRMS patients
exhibited an increased risk aversion during the decisional process
which might represent a conservative bias due to reduced
confidence in their choices. Moreover, impairment of explicit
emotional processes (as illustrated by the presence of alexithymia
and decreased counterfactual thinking) was also associated with
this deficit. DM is an important factor for active patients with MS,
for example when deciding for professional, private life, or
therapies. Informing them that the disease may have an influence
on management of counterfactual information and risk may help
them in certain crucial situation. These findings may help not only
to better understand the neural bases of DM and their disorders,
but also help better listen to and support these (typically young)
patients.
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